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Abstract 
Procurement Frameworks for Energy Performance Contracting (PFEPCs) simplify the process of 
negotiating, developing and implementing Energy Performance Contracts (EPCs) with Energy Service 
Companies (ESCOs). This paper analyses their role in promoting the implementation of cost-effective 
energy efficiency measures in the UK public sector. Compared to conventional approaches to 
procuring goods and services involving detailed specifications, PFEPCs translate the challenge of 
upgrading, retrofitting and replacing energy related equipment and infrastructures into required 
outputs through functional specifications. The innovativeness of specific PFEPCs often lies less in the 
diffusion of ‘developmental’ innovative energy efficient solutions, although partner bidding 
approaches create favourable conditions for innovation. However increasing standardisation and 
bundling prove successful at lowering transaction cost, which enables ESCOs to address projects 
which would not be considered in the absence of PFEPCs due to high transaction costs. This 
particular organisational innovation opens the market up to new approaches to implementing cost-
effective energy efficiency measures. 
Keywords 
Energy efficiency; energy performance contracting (EPC); energy service companies (ESCOs); public 
procurement of innovation; public sector. 
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1 Introduction 
It is well established that there is significant potential for improving the energy efficiency of public 
sector buildings (see IEA, 2013). Despite highly attractive rates of return, many public sector bodies 
struggle to finance and implement those improvements (Aasen, 2015; Gardner, 2013). Energy 
performance contracts (EPCs) provide a promising means of overcoming these difficulties and of 
accelerating the diffusion of energy efficient technologies (Polzin, 2015; Aasen, 2015). EPCs focus 
upon the delivery of final energy services, such as mobility and illumination, rather than individual 
end-use technologies (Sorrell, 2005, 2007). Typically, an EPC provider guarantees a specified level of 
energy savings over a defined period and finances the capital investment from these savings. 
Verification of those savings through agreed procedures for measurement and verification (M&V, 
see Appendix 7.1 for more information) may be undertaken by the EPC provider or an independent 
organisation. EPCs can allow public sector organisations to reduce operating costs, transfer risk and 
concentrate attention on core activities (Sorrell, 2005; Polzin, 2015). The client organisation typically 
negotiates the output required (i.e. energy savings, payback periods, maximum spend, etc.), rather 
than specifying the inputs (i.e. boiler replacement), thereby giving flexibility to the provider to 
innovate and deliver cost-effective solutions (DECC, 2012a). Companies offering EPCs and energy 
service contracts more generally are commonly referred to as energy service companies (ESCOs). 
Public sector buildings have long been established as a primary market for EPCs, owing to factors 
such as the generic nature of buildings and the relevant technologies, the multiple obstacles to in-
house energy management, the lack of finance for energy efficiency investment and the increasing 
reliance upon outsourcing (Hansen, 2009; Larsen, 2012). An important initiative in the UK public 
sector has been the development of procurement frameworks for EPCs (PFEPCs). Framework 
agreements are a common feature of public sector procurement and generally set out terms and 
conditions under which specific purchases or contracts (‘call offs’) can be made (see Appendix 7.1 for 
definitions}. Procurement frameworks for energy services involve standardised contracts that 
comply with EU procurement regulations and can be used with (in many cases pre-qualified) ESCOs 
for implementing energy efficiency projects. This type of framework is relatively novel in the UK but 
is growing in importance. The most important examples include those that have been specifically 
developed for local authorities, such as RE:FIT (RE:FIT, 2015) within the Greater London Authority; 
and those that have been developed for the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) but which are open 
to other parts of the UK public sector, such as the Carbon and Energy Fund (CEF, 2013). These 
frameworks aim to streamline the procurement of EPCs for public sector buildings by providing pre-
negotiated contracts that comply with relevant regulations. A key advantage of these frameworks is 
that they reduce the transaction costs of negotiating and establishing contracts and monitoring 
contract performance (Sorrell, 2005; Sorrell, 2007). The importance of PFEPCs in the UK public sector 
is reflected by the number of contracts that have been established under PFEPCs in recent years, the 
growing interest in this approach by a range of public sector bodies and the development of model 
contracts and guidance notes by UK government that are based upon those, specifically RE:FIT 
(DECC, 2015a). 
Previous research in the area of EPCs and energy service contracting/ESCOs more generally has been 
primarily concerned about transaction costs (Polzin, 2015; Sorrell, 2005, 2007) and the evolution and 
nature of ESCO markets (Bertoldi, 2006, 2007, 2014; Hansen, 2009; Marino, 2010, 2011). Only 
recently has there been a surge in interest in the role of ESCOs in providing energy services at a local 
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authority and municipal level (Aasen, 2015; Hannon, 2015b, a; Jensen, 2013; Polzin, 2015). 
Procurement frameworks for energy services such as the PFEPCs analysed in this paper have 
received comparatively little attention with only a limited number of academic publications 
mentioning one of them (RE:FIT) (Chmutina, 2014; Chmutina, 2012; Hannon, 2015b). 
In this paper, PFEPCs are understood as a form of public procurement for innovation (PPI) (Edquist, 
2012; Edler, 2007; Uyarra, 2014a). The experience with these PFEPCs can provide insights into the 
opportunities for, benefits of and obstacles to energy performance contracting in the public sector, 
together with the role of procurement frameworks in diffusing the EPC business model and cost-
effective energy efficiency measures. This paper adds a UK perspective to the growing international 
body of literature on drivers and barriers for EPCs in the public sector (Aasen, 2015; Patari, 2013; 
Polzin, 2015).The specific research question are:  
x How do PFEPCs compare? 
x What have PFEPCs achieved? 
x Do PFEPCs help diffuse innovative EPC business models? 
x Do PFEPCs help diffuse innovative energy efficient solutions? 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the methodology, section 3 provides 
background information on energy services and public procurement, PFEPCs and Public Procurement 
for Innovation (PPI – see Appendix 7.1 for more information). Section 4 compares and analyses 
PFEPCs to develop a typology based on earlier work on PPI. The paper demonstrates how this 
typology can also be helpful in understanding the public procurement of EPCs. Section 5 discusses 
the findings and section 6 concludes. A list of definitions is included in the Appendices. 
 
2 Methodology 
Data about the cases was collected through two channels. First, primary information was gathered 
through the analysis of public tender documents, through interviews with energy service contracting 
experts and by attending conferences and workshops related to the subject area. In total, 23 
interviews with experts in the field of energy efficiency and energy service contracting (see a 
detailed list of interviewees in appendix 7.3) were conducted. Where possible, the interviews were 
recorded and transcribed. Further primary information on PFEPCs was compiled by analysing 
academic publications, policy documents, press releases and reports. Different characteristics and 
outcomes of PFEPCs were identified through data content analysis of the interviews (Miles, 1984) 
and a review of the literature. Some of the information gathered in the interviews has not been used 
in this paper due to commercial sensibility. As a result, the numbers provided in this paper do not 
always provide the level of granularity that would be necessary for a more detailed comparison and 
analysis of PFEPCs, especially regarding the first two research questions. The empirical section 
nevertheless provides enough information to reach robust conclusions regarding the capacity of 
PFEPCs to diffuse innovative EPC business models and/or innovative energy efficiency solutions. 
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3 Energy services and public procurement 
3.1 Energy service provision in the public sector 
The fundamentals of providing energy services in the public sector are no different to energy service 
provision in other services. Selling final energy services (right of Figure 1) incentivises both the 
minimisation of supplying energy as a commodity (left of Figure 1) and the efficient use of useful 
energy streams (centre of Figure 1) using long-term EPCs. Figure 1 compares the scope of EPCs 
compared to energy supply contracts on a client site. 
 
 
EPCs enable cost-effective energy efficiency investments to take place but contractual complexity 
limits their applicability. High transaction costs1 and uncertainty regarding the risks involved hamper 
the widespread use of EPCs. Transactions costs comprise the costs associated with organising the 
delivery of energy services (Globerman, 1996; Sorrell, 2007). In the context of EPCs, direct 
transaction costs arise out of screening the EPC market and selecting an ESCO, negotiating contract 
details, establishing measurement and verification (M&V) criteria and associated legal costs, 
enforcing compliance and resolving disputes (Sorrell, 2005; Sorrell, 2007). Indirect transaction costs 
arise out of a lack of institutional awareness and trust, low priority and missing commitment, non-
standardised measurement and verification (M&V) of energy savings, legal complexities, missing 
energy cost information, difficult access to finance, risk assessment and mistrust against ESCOs 
(Polzin, 2015; Sorrell, 2005; Sorrell, 2007; Pätäri & Sinkhonen 2014). 
Dedicated intermediaries can help reduce transaction costs by helping clients identify projects, 
estimate savings, select a contractor and negotiate M&V criteria (Bleyl, 2013). Pre-negotiated 
                                                          
1 Transaction costs are the legal, administrative, information gathering and other costs within markets or 
internally within organisations associated with the transfer of goods, services or property rights (Sorrell, 2005, 
2007) 
Figure 1: Energy supply versus energy performance contracts (Sorrell, 2015) 
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contracts minimising legal fees and project bundling within a single contract also contribute to 
streamlining the process of contract negotiation. PFEPCs, the organisations hosting them and their 
dedicated resources act as intermediaries to help simplify the EPC procurement process on behalf of 
potential public sector clients by preparing, evaluating and/or managing business models, finance, 
documentation, contracts and M&V as well as fostering competition among ESCOs for particular 
projects. 
 
3.2 Procuring energy services in the UK public sector 
Regular procurement of an energy infrastructure upgrade projects usually takes approximately 18 
months. Benefits of cost-effective energy efficiency investment in the public sector are increased 
comfort, the reduction of running costs and mitigating against the impact of future energy price rises 
through reduced energy use. The procurement and delivery of energy services improvements in the 
health sector is also often used to reduce maintenance backlogs. Public procurement expenditure in 
the UK was approximately £190bn in 2010-2011 (Uyarra, 2014b) and utility consumption is typically 
the second highest overhead cost in the public sector after staffing (Hammond, 2014). Opportunities 
for improving energy efficiency in the public sector arise from common ownership and the 
homogeneous nature of facilities with common functions such as local authorities (municipalities), 
universities, schools and hospitals (referred to as the MUSH sector in the US, (Larsen, 2012)). 
Wider energy efficiency benefit arise from reduced carbon emissions, easier compliance with climate 
policies, improved working environments and fewer equipment failures (DECC, 2015b). The 
possibility of investments in buildings and green technologies generating local jobs and improving 
local skills may also be a feature of energy efficiency investments (Singh, 2010). These aspects are of 
particular interest to local authorities. Project bundling can help address the small size and high 
transaction costs associated with many energy efficiency projects by creating larger projects. 
Bundled projects are more likely to attract large and international firms and financiers compared to 
individual projects as bundling creates clear incentives for (energy) service providers, reduces their 
market risk, and enables learning and economies of scale (Edler, 2007; Uyarra, 2014; Uyarra, 2014). 
Typically the single largest purchaser in a country, the public sector has the capacity to harmonising 
procurement policies across and stimulate innovation (Singh, 2010; Uyarra, 2014 a,b) and EPCs are 
considered to be particular suitable for addressing untapped energy efficiency potentials in the 
public sector (DECC, 2015c; Larsen, 2012; Singh, 2010). OJEU compliant PFEPCs encourage the use of 
EPCs and potentially foster innovation by simplifying tendering procedures, by limiting bidding to (in 
most cases) pre-approved ESCOs, by including the associated fees and by providing access to all 
relevant procurement, technical and legal documentation (CEF, 2015). Compared to regular 
procurement, PFEPCs reduce procurement procedures by over a year, enabling Cost-effective energy 
efficiency measures to be installed within 6-9 months from start-up. 
 
3.3 How PFEPCs work 
A PFEPC is defined as an OJEU compliant framework agreement (see Appendix 7.1) with one or more 
operators (ESCOs) which allows the contracting authority to purchase energy services on behalf of 
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other contracting authorities. Selected ESCOs must be able to deliver and guarantee energy services 
to the client over the lifetime of the contract. The frameworks are not organisations per se. PFEPCs 
consist of no more than 10 people managing the process, usually employed by organisations 
governed by public law or regional or local authorities. 
As facilitators, PFEPCs aim to reduce transaction costs and information asymmetry between clients 
and ESCOs (Sorrell, 2005) associated with negotiating and establishing EPCs in the public sector and 
monitoring contract performance by streamlining of tendering and bidding processes and by 
providing standardised (‘package’) contracts, delivery guidance and in some cases entire delivery 
frameworks throughout the project life (CEF, 2013; RE:FIT, 2015). The PFEPC offering is aimed at 
directing finance (which may be sourced from third parties) towards cost-effective energy efficiency 
investments where the expected reduction in production cost of supplying energy services can more 
than offset the transaction cost of negotiating and managing the relationship between the public 
sector organisation and the ESCO (Sorrell, 2005; Polzin, 2015). 
The following five PFEPCs have been identified: 
x The Carbon and Energy Fund (CEF); 
x Essentia; 
x Ecovate; 
x RE:FIT within the Greater London Authority (GLA, 2015) and Local Partnerships which is 
extending the RE:FIT concept nationwide; 
x P-EPC developed by Peterborough City Council; 
This list is not exclusive although these five cases represent the most prominent PFEPCs in the UK as 
identified by (GIB, 2014), conference organisers (EMEX, 2014), PFEPCs themselves (CEF, 2015; DECC, 
2015c; Essentia, 2014; Ecovategroup, 2015; GLA, 2015; Honeywell, 2014; RE:FIT, 2015) and 
interviewees. The different PFEPCs have different host organisations and the degree of cooperation 
and collaborative development depends on the EPC approach and the different public sector sub-
agencies that are specifically targeted, such as the National Health Service (NHS), local authorities or 
consortia of public sector organisations (Fawkes, 2007). 
CEF was established in 2011 as a fund to support NHS projects to meet their energy efficiency and 
carbon reduction targets by simplifying the procurement process. CEF targets the largest public 
sector projects in terms of project value and client size (£m/a energy expenditure). Their approach 
requires very detailed contracts (300+ pages) as the resulting EPCs tend to be about large-scale 
infrastructural upgrades rather than retrofitting ‘soft touch’ generic, off-the-shelf energy efficiency 
measures (see Appendix 7.1 for more information). CEF originally focused on the installation of 
combined heat and power (CHP) plants before moving into energy efficiency. CEF’s bespoke EPCs for 
large-scale infrastructure upgrades are derived from design, build, finance and operate contracts 
(DBFO, a construction industry concept). An EPC procured through CEF involves client-ESCO 
cooperation from the beginning. Any of the pre-selected ESCOs interested in bidding typically 
requires 3-4 months to prepare their final bid providing fully priced and costed measures. This 
bidding process is well in excess of an Investment Grade Audit usually required for EPC bidding. 
Following a mini-competition the best bid is selected according to pre-determined criteria, such as 
the net annual saving across a specific timeframe (i.e. 15-30 years after installation). The ESCO then 
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installs the measures and takes on delivery and performance risk. Once it passes the compliance 
tests the payments and guaranteed savings begin (CEF, 2013). Measurement and verification (M&V) 
is the responsibility of an independent provider (TEAM, undated). 
Essentia was established in 2012 as a framework to support NHS trusts and public sector 
organisations to improve energy efficiency without upfront capital investments. Essentia clients may 
make use of its Energy Advisory Framework at their own cost to establish an independent 
benchmarking and potential measurement and verification (M&V) framework before entering a 
mini-competition to select one of the pre-approved ESCOs. The chosen ESCO completes an 
Investment Grade Audit to identify guaranteed energy saving measures before installing the 
measures and taking on delivery and savings risk. M&V is undertaken by an independent 
organisation signed up to Essentia’s Energy Advisory Framework. As the Essentia offer extends 
beyond EPCs to potentially include management and property consulting as well as strategic estates 
development and healthcare planning (in the NHS), contract length and detail may extent 
significantly beyond the 40-50 pages of the EPC contract. In the case of strategic estates 
development alongside an EPC, Essentia’s offer may resemble CEF’s infrastructure upgrade 
approach. 
Ecovate was established in 2013 as an open procurement framework to enable NHS and public 
sector organisations to derive maximum strategic benefit from large-scale estate-development 
projects that are funded via guaranteed energy savings. Ecovate has not been active for long enough 
to allow a thorough analysis of their PFEPC approach in great detail but their initial project at King’s 
College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust indicates that it is possible to encourage a collborative 
approach through open procurement. Rather than pre-approving ESCOs, Ecovate’s PFEPC requires 
every ESCO interested in bidding to fill out a pre-qualification questionnaire (PQQ, see Appendix 7.1 
for more detail), which takes around 4 weeks to complete, if it wants to bid for a project. This is 
considered acceptable for a contract that may last up to 15 years. The example of King’s College 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust’s EPC indicates that Ecovate’s collaborative approach encourages the 
selected ESCO to work in partnership with the Trust’s estates team throughout the Investment 
Grade Audit as well as the implementation phase. This allows the scope of the project to extend 
beyond the initial project specifications. The ESCO’s risk lies in doing a free Investment Grade Audit if 
they are unable to meet the client’s cost and energy saving requirements to which they committed 
during the procurement process. Rather than establishing a conventional M&V methodology 
Ecovate relies on annual spreadsheets provided by the ESCO. 
RE:FIT was established in 2010 as a programme to help public sector organisations in London 
achieve substantial financial savings, improve energy performance of their buildings and reduce their 
carbon footprint. In 2014 it was extended and altered to cover the whole of England. RE:FIT is an 
open book, public sector procurement framework with pre-approved ESCOs similar to CEF and 
Essentia. What sets it apart is its EU funded2 Programme Delivery Unit (PDU) to support all public 
sector organisations in London that wish to make use of RE:FIT’s EPC framework free of charge. The 
PDU acts as a dedicated intermediary providing technical support throughout the lifetime of the 
project as well as a free benchmarking service. The PDU also ensures that contracts always involve 
                                                          
2 European Local Energy Assistance (ELENA) provides financial and technical assistance to help local and 
regional authorities attract funding for sustainable energy projects 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecoap/about-eco-innovation/policies-matters/eu/535_en.htm) 
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more than one measure and that the companies do not make excessive margins on easy to 
implement single measures such as lighting. It also provides help for the establishment of EPCs as 
well as post-implementation services such as M&V checks. Once a project brief has been prepared, 
the mini competition is launched to select on the pre-approved ESCOs. The ESCO then carries out an 
Investment Grade Audit, energy efficiency measures are installed. M&V is carried out by the ESCO. 
RE:FITs dedication to simplifying the procurement process compared to abovementioned 
frameworks implies that it lends itself to the installation of ‘soft-touch’ measures. 
P-EPC was procured in 2013 as a contract to enable councils to deliver guaranteed energy 
performance improvements for council premises using third party finance. It was subsequently 
developed into a procurement framework in partnership between Peterborough City Council and 
Honeywell, the framework’s pre-approved ESCO which was chosen as a framework delivery partner. 
This approach lends itself to close collaboration between ESCO and client, which reduces the 
transaction costs for addressing individual projects. Depending on the type of project, more or less 
detailed Investment Grade Audits are undertaken and measures, in some cases replicable measures 
across multiple sites, installed. M&V is also undertaken by this ESCO which implies that this model is 
dependent on a trusted relationship between ESCO and client. 
A precondition for the establishment of competitive tendering and bidding environments, a feature 
of several PFEPCs, is the existence of appropriate service providers capable of implementing cost-
effective energy efficiency measures. Energy management has been outsourced in the UK since the 
1960s (Fawkes, 2007) although regulation has yet to recognise market developments to ensure cost-
effective implementation of measures. There are around 50 ESCOs operating in the UK (see 
Appendix 7.5) although the market is difficult to define as few companies offering ESCO solutions 
such as EPCs do so as their core business. Around 25 ESCOs appear to be offering EPCs and 22 are 
currently approved EPC contractors. 
 
3.4 Public procurement and public procurement for innovation 
In this research context, PFEPCs are understood not only as intermediaries but also as procurement 
frameworks that encourage innovation. Innovations resulting from PFEPCs are not limited to the 
outcome as the process itself of setting up an EPC through a PFEPC may help build trust in 
alternative procurement processes and delivery business models. For most public sector 
organisations in the UK, EPCs are perceived as new. For small-scale projects (annual energy bills of 
<£500,000) the use of EPCs may be considered ground-braking as high transaction costs usually 
render these projects inoperable (DECC, 2012b). Smaller and/or replicable individual contracts 
reduce transaction costs by limiting negotiable aspects of EPCs. Organisational innovation 
encouraging alternative procurement processes and delivery business models that reduce 
transaction costs need to be recognised alongside the implementation of cost-effective energy-
efficiency measures. 
As PFEPCs encourage a variety of innovative outcomes they are examples of public procurement of 
innovation (PPI). Compared to regular public procurement involving detailed specification of 
relevant goods and services, PPI, as a demand-side measure (Edquist, 2012; Lords, 2011; Uyarra, 
2014b), requires the translation of the identified challenge into functional specifications relating to 
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performance, quality and desired outcomes (Edquist, 2012). Recent findings suggest that procurers 
should focus on the whole “cycle of need” (Georghiou, 2014). In relation to energy this implies the 
negotiation of outputs (required energy services) by encouraging suppliers to propose alternative 
and innovative solutions through demand-side instruments rather than the specification of inputs. 
To ensure that procurement moves beyond regular, input focused procurement, the risk of 
procuring innovative services needs to be reduced as a risk-averse culture in the public sector often 
precludes the use of innovative solutions (Georghiou, 2014; Lords, 2011). This may be achieved by 
collaborative learning and close cooperation between procurement officers and suppliers 
throughout one or more of the stages of the procurement process (Edquist, 2012; NESTA, 2007). 
Learning is considered a key dimension of PPI and innovation more generally (Edquist, 2012; Uyarra, 
2014 a,b). 
Supplier involvement with project specifications can allow the supplier to gain a more in-depth 
understanding of requirements and issues that need addressing. It also allows the procurers to gain 
a deeper understanding of supplier offerings. Depending on the extent of collaboration and levels of 
trust between procurement officers and suppliers, opportunities to develop innovative solutions 
may arise (Edquist, 2012). Collaborative development of functional specifications creates favourable 
conditions for innovation by providing suppliers with the flexibility to design and deliver projects 
without major limitations and by increasing competition (Uyarra, 2014 a, b). 
PFEPCs in this context be understood as frameworks that help procuring a partner for outcomes 
rather than technological inputs. To classify the different procurement approaches and frameworks 
we use a typology for the analysis of PPI originally developed by (Edquist, 2012). We have adapted 
this typology to reflect the specifics of PFEPCs. The distinction between direct procurement (the 
procuring organisation is also the end-user of the product or service and uses its own demand to 
stimulate innovation) and catalytic procurement (the procuring organisation serves as a ‘catalyst, 
coordinator and technical resource for the benefit of the end-users’), for example, is not of 
relevance given the frameworks’ catalytic nature. Ecovate and P-EPC emerged from the direct 
procurement of an EPC but the establishment of a framework implies that it is intended for use by 
other organisations than the contracting authority. The distinction between incremental or 
developmental procurement is of greater relevance in this context as the categorisation of PFEPCs as 
PPIs in the first place depends to a large extent upon the character of the innovation embedded in 
the product or service. The two main distinctions of PFEPCs are: 
x Incremental (diffusion oriented) procurement refers to incremental products or services and 
innovation refers to the adaptation to local conditions. 
x Developmental (emergence oriented) procurement refers to radically new products or 
services resulting from the procurement process. 
Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia’s (2012) specify the degree of cooperation as a third dimention to 
the classification of PPI although they consider it a matter of degrees rather than a dichotomous 
variable. For the sake of this research we have expanded their typology relating to the level of 
cooperation between ESCO and client and the degree to which a PFEPC aims at replicating the 
process. 
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x Simplification (reducing transaction costs) refers to the degree to which the EPC negotiation 
process is streamlined and modularised. 
x Cooperation (development of trust) refers the degree to which ESCOs and clients are 
encouraged to establish a trusted relationship. 
The distinction between replication and cooperation focused PFEPCs is critical for the type of 
projects that transaction costs are reduced for. The following section empirically investigates the 
PFEPCs according to this typology. 
 
4 Empirical section 
 
4.1 Background information on PFEPCs 
Section 3.3 specified how PFEPCs work. The empirical section analyses PFEPCs using information 
derived from public tenders (Tenders, 2013a; TED, 2012b; TED, 2012a; TED, 2013c; TED, 2013a; TED, 
2013b; TED, 2014; TED, 2015; Tenders, 2012; Tenders, 2013b) with information gained from 
interviews and other sources of information (CEF, 2013; CEF, 2015; DECC, 2015c; Essentia, 2014; 
Ecovategroup, 2015; GIB, 2014; GLA, 2015; Honeywell, 2014; RE:FIT, 2015) (see also Appendix 7.4 for 
more information). Table 1 provides information on the PFEPCs’ contracting authority and the type 
of contracting authority. 
CEF Essentia Ecovate RE:FIT P-EPC 
Countess of Chester 
Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Guy's and St Thomas' 
NHS Foundation Trust 
Essentia Trading on 
behalf of Guy's and St 
Thomas' NHS 
Foundation Trust 
King's College 
Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Transport for London 
(Premises Projects 
and Commercial 
Services on behalf of 
the Greater London 
Authority 
Peterborough City 
Council 
Body governed by 
public law 
Body governed by 
public law 
Body governed by 
public law 
Regional or local 
authority 
Regional or local 
authority 
 
Table 2 provides the exact titles of the PFEPCs derived from tender documents. Apart from P-EPC 
they all are described as frameworks although their titles also provide insights into the different 
priorities attached to the delivery of EPCs. The relatively short contract durations are an indication of 
the limited addressable market for PFEPCs. According to one interviewee: 
‘…Reality is we’re going to do NHS up to a certain point and then we will do universities and 
then I think what will happen is that other frameworks will follow on behind us and then I’ll 
just give up and go home…’ (PFEPC representative) 
 
 
 
Table 1: PFEPCs contracting authorities 
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CEF Essentia Ecovate RE:FIT P-EPC 
National Framework 
Agreement to supply 
carbon and energy 
infrastructure 
upgrades 
Strategic 
Sustainability 
Transformation 
Framework 
National Framework 
for Energy, Carbon 
and Backlog 
Maintenance 
Management Services 
– Performance 
Contract 
RE:FIT framework 
(public buildings 
retrofit programme) 
Blue Sky 
Peterborough: Energy 
Performance 
Contracting 
Programme 
Duration in months: 
48 
Duration in months: 
48 with no possible 
renewal 
Duration in months: 
24 with one possible 
renewal 
Duration in months: 
48 
Duration in months: 
96      
 
Table 3 provides some information on the functional and technical specifications along with some 
detail on the objectives of the PFEPCs. 
CEF Essentia Ecovate RE:FIT P-EPC 
Fund and support 
projects that meet a 
certain level of carbon 
savings per £ of 
investment required 
Guaranteed energy 
savings over lifetime 
of contract based on 
reduction of kWh or 
£ savings and 
guaranteed reduction 
of carbon emissions                       
Energy consumption 
savings delivered by a 
single supplier 
guaranteeing 
performance, kWh 
consumption 
reduction and 
financial savings 
Improve the energy 
performance of public 
sector buildings, 
reducing carbon 
emissions and 
achieving guaranteed 
annual kWh and cost 
savings 
20% guaranteed 
energy saving (known 
as the 80% guarantee) 
 
It is interesting to note that CEF does not specify guaranteed savings or performance while the other 
four specify guaranteed energy savings. Ecovate and RE:FIT specifically mention the improvement of 
energy performance although a savings guarantee precludes a link between contract payments and 
equipment performance. As mentioned above, CEF, Essentia and Ecovate are contracted by (health) 
bodies governed by public law, while RE:FIT and P-EPC are contracted by regional or local authorities 
(Table 4). The tender documents also provide information about potential clients (Table 4). 
CEF Essentia Ecovate RE:FIT P-EPC 
Health General public 
services and Health 
General public 
services and Health 
General public 
services 
General public 
services and 
Environment 
NHS Bodies and 
various other public 
sector organisations 
UK public sector 
bodies 
UK public sector 
bodies 
UK public sector 
bodies 
Local authorities, 
educational 
establishments, 
registered social 
landlords, and 
equivalent 
contracting 
authorities in the UK 
 
Table 2: Background information and contract duration of PFEPCs 
Table 3: Functional and technical specification of PFEPCs 
Table 4: Main activity and addressable clients of contracting authorities 
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4.2 Comparison of PFEPCs 
Official tender documents (Tenders, 2013a; TED, 2012b; TED, 2012a; TED, 2013c; TED, 2013a; TED, 
2013b; TED, 2014; TED, 2015; Tenders, 2012; Tenders, 2013b) reveal that CEF, Essentia, Ecovate and 
RE:FIT are contracting on behalf of UK public sector authorities (Table 4). P-EPC has a more narrow 
focus on local authorities and associated public sector organisations. P-EPC also offers property 
management as opposed to engineering services (see Appendices 7.4 and 7.5 for more detail) 
although in practice it is considered an alternative to RE:FIT. While RE:FIT, CEF, Essentia and Ecovate 
operate at slightly different scales across slightly different areas of the public sector, using a similar 
range of ESCOs (see Appendix 7.6), P-EPC works with one pre-approved supplier (Table 5). 
CEF Essentia Ecovate RE:FIT P-EPC 
16 ESCOs chosen for 
mini-competition 
8 ESCOs chosen for mini-
competition 
Maximum number of 8 
of the UK’s ‘most 
accomplished’ ESCOs 
12 ESCOs chosen for 
mini-competition 
1 ESCO chosen 
 
CEF, Essentia and RE:FIT’s pre-qualification and short-listing of ESCOs ensures that only fully qualified 
and capable ESCOs are invited to submit proposals. The criteria of pre-qualification vary according to 
the PFEPC and the sector it was originally designed to address. CEF’s Essentia’s and RE:FIT’s mini-
competitions allow ESCOs to submit project proposals without the need to engage in time 
consuming OJEU tendering procedures. In the case of CEF and RE:FIT usually around 5 ESCOs submit 
project proposals. 14 ESCOs responded to Ecovate’s advert and filled out the PQQ, of which 5 were 
shortlisted, which indicates that around 5 ESCOs tend to apply for any specific project scale. 
The sources of finance vary considerably between the PFEPCs (Table 6). CEF sources funding from 
the UK government’s Green Investment Bank as well as high street banks and pension funds. 
Essentia provides the option of ESCO (co-)funding. P-EPC has been designed around clients sourcing 
finance from the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB). The PWLB lends money from the National Loans 
Fund to local authorities with a 4% interest rate, and collects the repayment (DMO, 2015). This 
implicitly limits P-EPC’s application to local authorities and associated organisations. RE:FIT provides 
a wide range of funding options including dedicated energy efficiency funds such as London Energy 
Efficiency Fund, Salix and Sustainable Development Capital LLP as well as PWLB and banks. In 
practice, large projects tend to require finance from a variety of sources while smaller projects are 
often financed through funding sourced by client organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Type of call and number of operators 
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CEF Essentia Ecovate RE:FIT P-EPC 
- Funding sourced by 
the client organisation 
- Funding sourced by 
the CEF 
- Funding brought to 
the contract by the 
bidder 
- Off-balance sheet 
transactions 
- Funding sourced by 
the client organisation 
- Co-funding with the 
bidder 
- Funding brought to 
the contract by the 
bidder 
- Funding sourced by 
the client organisation 
- Grants 
- Government 
incentives 
- Capital borrowing 
- Off-balance sheet 
transactions 
- Mix of the above 
- Funding sourced by 
the client organisation 
- Grants 
- Government 
incentives 
- Capital borrowing 
- Loans 
- Concession 
agreements 
- Finance/operating 
leases 
- Off-balance sheet 
transactions 
- Mix of the above 
- Funding sourced by 
the client organisation 
(preferably Public 
Works Loan Board 
(PWLB)) 
 
‘Soft touch’ measures as opposed to infrastructure replacement projects are often financed through 
revenue budgets and a surprising number of projects (up to 80% of RE:FIT projects) are financed by 
the client organisation. Apart from revenue budgets this may include capital funding provided by the 
customer (from existing capital programmes or government). What all PFEPCs have in common is 
that funding is repaid through energy savings. 
Differences between the PFEPCs are more apparent when comparing contract length and detail from 
information derived from literary sources and interviews, which is not immediately obvious from the 
information provided in the tender documents due to unspecified inputs on behalf of Essentia, 
RE:FIT and P-EPC (Table 7). CEF offers the longest contracts both in theory and in practice. Essentia 
contracts are slightly shorter while Ecovate’s only contract to date is slightly shorter again although 
it does not necessarily reflect Ecovate’s target market as specified in the tender documents (see 
Table 4). Average RE:FIT EPCs are significantly shorter than those resulting from PFEPCs targeting the 
health sector (CEF, Essentia and Ecovate). P-EPC needs to be seen in the context of competing with 
RE:FIT at a local authority level while the other four PFEPCs, including RE:FIT, may be applied to 
larger projects (see GIB, 2014 for an example from the NHS). 
CEF Essentia Ecovate RE:FIT P-EPC 
15-30 years (after 
installation) or the life 
of the plant installed 
Not specified maximum of 20 years 
from date of award 
Not specified Not specified 
15-25 year contracts 10-20 year payback 11 year payback 5-12 year payback 15 year payback 
 
 
4.3 Achievements of PFEPCs 
Table 8 provides an overview of the achievements of the PFEPCs analysed in this paper. Due to a lack 
commercial sensitivity and a shortage of robust information, more precise figures are not available. 
 
Table 6: Sources of finance 
Table 7: Anticipated contract durations and contract lengths in practice 
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CEF Essentia Ecovate RE:FIT P-EPC 
- +50 NHS hospitals 
- £6m average project 
value 
- +£20m in saving 
- 15-20% average 
energy and carbon 
savings (up to 50%) 
- 15-25 year payback 
- Project value up to 
£100m including 
infrastructure 
schemes (biggest 
current project £36m) 
- +14 NHS Trusts 
- £8-10 average 
project value 
- 14-16% average 
energy and carbon 
savings 
- +1 NHS Trust 
- 9% energy and 
carbon saving 
- 11 years payback 
- Project value up to 
£10m 
- +199 London public 
sector organisations 
- +460 buildings 
- +33,000t of carbon 
savings 
- +£68.6m of 
investment 
- 15-20% average 
energy and carbon 
savings (up to 47%) 
- 5-12 year payback (8 
on average) 
- Project value up to 
£10m (biggest current 
project £6m) 
- +50 local authority 
buildings and schools 
- +£2.1m in revenue 
and capital avoidance 
saving from £4.4 of 
investment 
- 20% energy and 
carbon saving 
- 15 year payback 
 
Table 8 suggests that energy savings are broadly the same (in the range of 15-20%) across all PFEPCs. 
Ecovate’s guaranteed energy savings are lower than the average but they need to be understood in 
the context of only one project to date. Ecovate’s EPCs also need to be considered as ‘fabric first’ 
energy savings that other PFEPCs may not prioritise due to relatively long payback periods and 
relatively modest energy savings, especially if EPCs are designed around CHP installation. As the 
most established frameworks, CEF and RE:FIT provide the most detailed information on energy and 
carbon savings. 
CEF’s DBFO approach is based primarily on large assets despite being technologically neutral. CHP 
usually represents the cornerstone technology for retrofits. By displacing energy use, CHP in 
combination with other technologies such as lighting retrofits, variable speed drives, voltage 
optimisation and the installation of renewables can achieve savings of up to 50%. Its project range is 
from £1m to the £36m 25 year project at Addenbrookes, Cambridge University Hospitals, although 
its average projects size is £6m. The largest CEF project will eventually save around 25,000t/CO2/a. 
CEF’s 40+ current projects save 35-40,000t/CO2/a, £7.5-8m/a and 90-95m/kWh/a (CEF, 2015). 
RE:FIT has procured EPCs for a wide range of public sector organisations in London, ranging from 
councils to universities and hospitals, through its 12 appointed ESCOs. Its School and Small 
programmes address such projects using one pre-approved supplier each to help reduce transaction 
costs. Over 440 buildings have been retrofitted to date and it is aiming to retrofit 600 buildings by 
the end of 2015. The framework has triggered over £60m of capital investment and saved over 30, 
000t/CO2 from over 400 building retrofits. Annual energy savings amount to over £5m (GLA, 2015). 
Essentia’s target market for EPCs is similar to CEF’s, with higher average investments and slightly 
shorter payback periods compared to CEF. However, as Essentia offers a wide range of other 
services, including strategic estates development, the final contract can be of a similar scale and 
complexity of CEF DBFO contracts. Ecovate targets the same market as Essentia and CEF although its 
focus lies more on a ‘fabric first’ approach to technologies and behaviour change, which are less 
likely to be prioritised in large infrastructural upgrades targeted by CEF in particular. Essentia 
appointed 8 ESCOs for the delivery of EPCs. Compared to CEF it is based more on a partnership 
approach and its emphasis on flexibility implies that contract lengths vary from 70 pages to 100+ 
Table 8: PFEPC achievements 
16 
 
pages compared to CEF’s 300+ page contract. To date, Essentia has procured 14 EPCs in the health 
sector with an average project size of £8-10m. 
Ecovate also encourages a partnership approach. Compared to CEF and Essentia’s asset focused 
EPCs, Ecovate also encourages a ‘fabric first’ approach. As the focus is less on displacement of use, 
energy savings are lower compared to its health sector competitors. Its single EPC to date is a £8m 
hospital project which is set to reduce energy consumption by 9% with an 11 year payback. 
P-EPC, at least in theory, is not limited to a particular scale but its focus on local authorities and 
associated public sector organisations implies that (hospital) district heating schemes are less likely 
to be procured using its framework than any of the others (GIB, 2014). P-EPC is the only framework 
with one pre-approved supplier for the entire EPC delivery. This implies that if a client wants to use 
the P-EPC framework, Honeywell will be the delivery partner. The lack of competition in the choice 
of an ESCO may be a factor which usually increases transaction costs for the client (Sorrell, 2007) but 
the trusted approach of working in partnership with a single delivery partner has proven useful for 
bundling and addressing the smallest of projects.  
Figure 4 schematically compares the PFEPCs in relation to project scale (‘soft touch’ measurs vs. 
infrastructure replacement) and contract duration. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Comparing project scales and contract durations of PFEPCs in the UK public sector 
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4.4 Developing a typology of PFEPCs 
4.4.1 Incremental vs. developmental procurement 
Key to comparing PFEPC achievements and their capacity to diffuse innovative EPC business models 
and/or innovative energy efficiency solutions is the development of a typology which allows the 
comparison of procurement procedures and outcomes in relation to the criteria set out in 3.2 
although there are some difficulties in deriving conclusions based on the achievements of PFEPCs to 
date. The figures provided in Table 8 (section 4.3) indicate the difference in project size between 
PFEPCs. Project size alone, however, is not the only criteria for success. A PFEPC encouraging 
incremental solutions using off-the-shelf measures for small-scale projects may be considered 
innovative as it may lend itself to replicating or ‘productising’ (Harkonen, 2015) long-term EPCs by 
reducing transaction costs. Retrofitting lighting, building energy management system (BEMS) and 
boiler improvement/replacement for example provide a low-risk replicable solution as these ‘soft 
touch’ measures do not require significant alteration of the building fabric or energy infrastructure. 
This approach is pursued by both P-EPC and RE:FIT, specifically RE:FIT’s School and Small 
programmes. In both cases one pre-approved supplier provides the energy services without the 
need to go through a mini-competition. P-EPC has successfully rolled out these technologies through 
Honeywell across more than 30 schools guaranteeing cost and energy savings of 20%. Such small 
projects would otherwise not be targeted by ESCOs as in one case the annual energy bills amounted 
to just £5,000, around 1% of the £500,000 threshold usually considered economical for EPCs (DECC, 
2012b). RE:FIT pre-procured Mitie for its RE:FIT School programme with individual project values as 
low as £50,000 and British Gas for its RE:FIT Small programme with project values starting at 
£500,000. Both P-EPC and RE:FIT’s School and Small programmes aim at reducing transaction costs 
at the small end of project scale through replication, which is only possible by allowing projects to be 
bundled. Technologically these solutions may be incremental but the key innovation lies in diffusing 
the EPC business model to projects usually considered too small in terms of project size and annual 
energy expenditure to be viable. 
Despite its limitations, a technologically incremental approach may also provide greater savings than 
the 20% targeted by P-EPC. Proven technologies such as combined heat and power (CHP) replacing 
inefficient boilers can significantly reduce energy demand. These projects, however, move beyond 
the ‘soft touch’ measures and ‘fabric first’ approaches and usually entail contracts of increasing 
complexity and a greater emphasis on construction akin to DBFO contracts. Contracts exceeding 70 
pages in length only address the >£1m project size and >£1m annual energy expenditure market. 
Projects at this scale benefit more from competition to reduce transaction costs and a combination 
of development oriented procurement and cooperative project development to achieve the best 
outcomes for the client organisation. Key to the diffusion of innovative (developmental) energy 
efficiency solutions is therefore competition among ESCOs but this approach is only viable for 
projects in excess of £1m in both project size and annual energy expenditure market. For PFEPCs 
targeting the health sector this figure is the absolute minimum with average project sizes varying 
between £6m-£10m. According to one interviewee: 
‘…you don’t need us if you’re doing a £1m project […] and I would advise you to do it yourself 
[…] but if you’re going to rip out the guts of a hospital in a live environment and replace the 
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boilers, and people die if they don’t work, and you’re arguing over £5-10m contracts, you 
don’t want to be left on your own…’ (PFEPC representative) 
4.4.2 Simplification vs cooperation 
The other main distinction aside from incremental or developmental EPC approaches is the degree 
of cooperation. The degree of cooperation is not a dichotomous variable but rather a matter of 
degree as there is always some form of cooperation between procurers and ESCOs (Edquist, 2012). It 
affects the transaction costs for establishing EPCs as high levels of cooperation between the 
procurer and the ESCO can lead to the development of trusted relationships. Rather than 
implementing EPCs with low risk technologies for low risk clients a cooperative approach may 
encourage more innovative approaches both in terms of the EPC business model and energy 
efficiency solutions. Table 9 gives an indication of cooperation between procurers and ESCOs. 
 
 
CEF Essentia Ecovate RE:FIT P-EPC 
-  3-4 months auditing 
and bid drafting 
process (in excess of 
Investment Grade 
Audits) 
- Scoring system for 
net annual 
guaranteed savings 
across 15-25 years 
determines choice of 
ESCO 
- Essentia provides all 
parties with the 
criteria at the 
beginning of the 
project 
- ‘Fabric first’ 
approach 
- Partnership 
approach allows 
clients to improve 
long-term energy 
outlook 
the establishment of a 
cooperative 
relationship with 
suppliers 
- Interested ESCOs 
need to fill out a pre-
qualification 
questionnaire before 
they can bid 
- The successful ESCO 
undertakes a 6 month 
IGA 
- ‘Fabric first’ 
approach 
- Close cooperation 
with the ESCO 
resulted in annual 
spreadsheets chosen 
over M&V 
- Focus on simple 
tendering in line with 
public procurement 
requirements 
- RE:FIT England 
encourages closer 
cooperation through 
partner bidding 
- Single supplier 
approach entails high 
levels of cooperation 
for project 
identification 
- Level of cooperation 
for individual projects 
limited which enables 
school projects with 
energy bills as low as 
£5,000 to be included 
in the EPC 
 
One of the key determinant for cooperation is the bidding approach (Table 10, see Appendix 7.1 
Definitions). The difference between target bidding and partner bidding lies in the flexibility of 
targets and measures installed. Target bidding involves the specification of a target (or key driver), 
such as a carbon, cost or energy saving, which may coincide with targets set out by other authorities 
(such as Carbon Reduction Commitments3). The guaranteed savings are identified at the tendering 
stage. Partner bidding implies that no target is specified. This allows the project to develop further 
through closer cooperation between procurer and ESCO before the savings are guaranteed. Partner 
bidding encourages innovation as it is perceived to be less prescriptive by the ESCO. 
 
                                                          
3 Carbon Reduction Commitment Energy Efficiency Scheme is a mandatory carbon emissions reporting and 
pricing scheme to cover large public and private sector organisations in the UK 
Table 9: Degree of cooperation in the procurement process 
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CEF Essentia Ecovate RE:FIT P-EPC 
Target bidding Partner bidding Partner bidding RE:FIT London: Target 
bidding, RE:FIT 
England: Target or 
partner bidding 
Target bidding 
 
Table 9 shows that the degree of cooperation may appear high in the case of CEF as ESCOs preparing 
bids spend 3-4 months auditing. However, CEF’s perceived inflexibility as well as their detailed 
information gathering approach, high costs and its scoring system based on savings guaranteed 
across 15-25 years are considered too rigid and complex by some interviewees as it effectively 
results in target bidding (Table 10). Essentia, according to this view, provides all parties with all the 
information at the beginning of the process which encourages more flexible partnership approaches 
(Table 9 and 10). Despite the complexity of the CEF procurement process it has proven successful for 
40+ projects and wide variety of project scales. Ecovate encourages the development of the project 
in partnership between the ESCO and the client throughout the Investment Grade Audit. The scope 
may extend beyond energy saving to improve operational efficiency and address backlog 
maintenance, which is similar to Essentia’s partner bidding process. Ecovate’s £8m EPC with 
Schneider Electric for example was chosen over a £10m project, which would have included 
windows, and a £24m project which would have included a chilled water system. The £8m project 
was chosen as it removed £3.1m of backlog maintenance including asbestos removal. Schneider 
Electric’s ‘fabric first’ approach the development of a district Low Temperature Hot Water (LTHW) 
scheme, the installation of plate heat exchangers, thermal pipe insulation and an overhaul of the 
BEMS in close cooperation with the in-house energy management team. 
For smaller projects, particularly the <£1m project size and <£1m annual energy expenditure market, 
partner bidding is often considered unviable as it entails higher transaction costs than target bidding. 
RE:FIT England has nevertheless embraced partner bidding for its mini competitions as is allows 
projects to move away from limited budgets and ESCOs can sometimes increase savings significantly 
with only a moderate budget increase. P-EPC’s approach is based around the ‘80% guarantee’, which 
implies that Honeywell guarantees that energy expenditures amount to 80% of what they were 
before the implementation of the EPC. Close cooperation between procurer and ESCO is 
nevertheless evident with school project bundling which has enabled schools with annual energy 
expenditures as little as £5,000 to be part of an EPC. 
 
4.4.3 PFEPC typology 
In general, collaborative development of functional specifications through partner bidding creates 
favourable conditions for innovation by providing suppliers with the flexibility to design and deliver 
projects without major limitations and by increasing competition (Uyarra, 2014 a, b). For PFEPCs the 
degree of cooperation is of particular relevance as the individual PFEPCs entail different approaches, 
either to reduce transaction costs or to encourage trusted relationships between the ESCO and the 
client (Table 9). The latter is more likely to encourage collaborative development and developmental 
procurement while the former is more likely to encourage technologically incremental solutions. 
Innovation may nevertheless result from incremental technological approaches through by 
Table 10: Approach to bidding 
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developing ‘packages’ of technological solutions that can be rolled out across homogeneous estates 
and/or facilities with common functions. 
According to Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia’s (2012) PPI framework, which has been modified for 
the purposes of this analysis, the PFEPCs can be classified as follows: 
 
Incremental procurement Developmental procurement 
Replication oriented 
P-EPC; RE:FIT London CEF 
Cooperation oriented 
 RE:FIT England Essentia; Ecovate 
 
This typology suggests that PFEPCs which have emerged from the health sector can generally be 
classified as developmental. This is the result of large project size and annual expenditure which 
allows ESCOs to implement a wide range of energy efficiency measures. The difference lies in their 
approach to replication and cooperation. CEF’s developmental DBFO approach is characterised by a 
lack of flexibility in comparison of Essentia and Ecovate but its benefit lies in the replicability of its 
approach. This is reflected by number of EPCs that have been procured using the CEF framework. 
Essentia and Ecovate are more cooperation oriented although their target is to ultimately provide a 
replicable framework that can be rolled out across the public sector. The benefits of their 
approaches, particularly Ecovate’s, is the focus on savings that are less likely to be targeted if the 
focus lies on replicability. By encouraging a ‘fabric first’ approach ESCOs are less inclined to 
implement proven technologies that displace use, such as CHP. 
PFEPCs that have been developed by local authorities are classified as incremental due to the 
relatively small project sizes, which usually limits the range of energy efficiency measures installed. 
What is more important than the diffusion of innovative energy efficiency solutions is their ability to 
encourage project bundling, replication and simplification. Associated innovative EPC business 
models have enabled RE:FIT and P-EPC to target schools with annual energy bills as low as £50,000 
and £5,000 respectively. 
To summarise, PFEPCs targeting primarily local authorities tend to focus on incremental 
procurement in terms of technologies installed using innovative EPC business models to reduce 
transaction costs for small projects. PFEPCs targeting primarily the health sector tend to emphasize 
competition to reduce transaction costs for large projects and provide greater opportunities for 
developmental procurement approaches. 
5 Discussion 
Apart from brief references particularly to RE:FIT (Chmutina, 2014; Chmutina, 2012; Hannon, 2015b), 
UK PFEPCs have not been researched to date in an academic context. The choice of theoretical 
framework arose out of the PFEPCs’ remit to close a gap in energy efficiency investments and their 
success developing EPCs ranging from public sector organisations with annual energy bills as low as 
Table 11: PFEPC typology 
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£5,000 to estates development projects worth £36m although no PFEPC covers the entire spectrum. 
Different PFEPCs address different public sector markets and their approaches vary accordingly. 
All PFEPCs spread risk by transferring the technical and delivery risks from clients to ESCOs. Major 
differences between PFEPCs are apparent in the way finance is sourced, which reflects their target 
markets. Large EPCs often require finance from a wide range of sources including commercial banks 
and government subsidised banks such as the UK’s Green Investment Bank. Smaller EPCs may be 
entirely financed from revenue and maintenance budgets. Local authorities can make use of PWLBs 
at favourable conditions. Small projects often see clients source their own finance, especially. 
Compared to other countries (Patari, 2013) and sectors (specifically the SME sector, (WSBF, 2013)), 
there does not appear to be a shortage of finance for public sector EPCs and energy efficiency 
projects in general. This research therefore contributes to the development of our understanding of 
how transaction costs associated with energy service delivery can be reduced (Sorrell, 2007) and 
energy efficiency markets effectively developed (Fawkes, 2013). 
By combining accessible finance with simplified procurement procedures, PFEPCs can contribute to 
the accelerated diffusion of incremental and in some cases more developmental energy efficiency 
innovations in the public sector, which may result in significant energy and carbon savings. 
Classifying PFEPC procurement as truly ‘developmental’ according to (Edquist, 2012) categorisation 
may be too optimistic due to the inherent risk the application of untested technologies entails 
(Uyarra, 2014b). Displacing use for instance by replacing inefficient boilers with CHP can 
nevertheless yield significant total savings although significant energy demand reduction appears to 
be a more likely result of ‘fabric first’ projects. 
The key innovation often lies less in the diffusion of ‘developmental’, innovative energy efficient 
solutions but rather in the reduction of transaction costs through innovative EPC business models. 
While large projects may include innovative estates development solutions alongside energy service 
delivery and infrastructure replacement projects, projects bundling small organisations such as 
schools in a single EPC allows ESCOs to concentrate more on retrofitting and the installation of 
replicable ‘soft touch’ measures with low associated transaction costs. 
By providing ‘package’ solutions the significant upstream services (pre-implementation) including 
energy audits, equipment sales and costings as well as downstream services (post-implementation) 
including O&M and M&V (see Appendix 7.1 for more information) usually associated with the 
implementation of energy efficiency technologies are less costly and time consuming. The 
transactions costs associated with providing such upstream and downstream services are often 
considered prohibitive for EPCs (Sorrell, 2005, 2007). The fewer upstream and downstream services 
are included, the lower the transaction costs. 
With single pre-approved suppliers removing competitive pressures, RE:FIT schools and P-EPC can 
offer ‘package’ EPCs to schools with energy bills as low as £50,000/a and £5,000/a respectively. In 
the commercial sector it is usually assumed that only organisations with energy bills exceeding 
£500,000/a can be successfully targeted using EPCs (DECC, 2012b) although new forms of project 
bundling are also changing the nature of cost-effective energy efficiency measure financing and 
implementation. Minimising upstream and downstream services included enables the EPCs to be 
productised, turning them effectively into regular procurement akin to ready-made ‘off-the-shelf’ 
products. 
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PFEPCs may also enable ESCOs to bundle particular steps required to implement energy efficiency 
projects. By providing standardised contracts, PFEPCs help address the legal complexity associated 
with long-term energy efficiency contracts (Marino, 2010; Patari, 2013). Some PFEPCs also address 
uncertainty surrounding M&V by either including independent M&V or scrutinising M&V performed 
by the ESCO. Bundling, standardisation and monitoring of M&V reduce transaction costs (by 
reducing general uncertainty regarding energy efficiency investments – see (Aasen, 2015; Patari, 
2013; Polzin, 2015) but different approaches result in different outcomes. 
For more developmental, radical innovations, partnership approaches appear to prove more 
successful than ‘productised’ incremental approaches aiming to establish EPCs as a regular 
procurement option as they enable the development of a trusted relationship between the ESCO 
and the client. The downside of more developmental approaches is that they are associated with 
higher transaction costs than contracts based on standardised bidding processes. These can be 
offset by allowing for contingencies such as technological advancement (Fawkes, 2013). The main 
benefit of PFEPCs to the public sector nevertheless lies in the reduction of both direct and indirect 
transaction costs of installing cost-effective energy efficiency measures despite the PFEPCs’ 
tendency to reduce the incentive to innovate (as one interviewee put it: ‘…frameworks stifle 
innovation…’ –see also (Uyarra, 2014b)). 
6 Conclusion 
EPC market activity in the public sector is receiving a significant boost with the launch of PFEPCs, 
hence the achievements of the frameworks are clearly visible. The RE:FIT framework for example has 
contributed significantly to building retrofits accounting for 41% of the overall investment required 
to achieve the Mayor’s 60% carbon cut by 2025 (RE:FIT, 2015). CEF appears to be on track for 
upgrading 240 NHS trusts over 16 years. The growing number of PFEPCs is an indication of their 
success in expanding the UK EPC market, particularly for projects that would traditionally not have 
been addressed due to prohibitively high transaction costs. 
Main differences in approaching the procurement process result firstly from the call and number of 
operators targeted. Approaches to reduce transaction costs range from pre-qualified ESCOs to mini-
competition among bidders. Second the sources of funding vary considerably ranging from funding 
of the client organisation to public loans. Larger projects tend to be financed by a number of 
different sources. Third the average contract length relates to the sector in which the PFEPCs are 
applied. RE:FIT targets local authorities, which in general have smaller buildings (which results in the 
shortest payback period of 5-12 years) than the hospitals targeted by CEF, Essentia and Ecovate 
(resulting in 10-25 years payback time). Fifth the developmental and incremental approaches can be 
found among the procurement frameworks which influences the kind of technologies applied. Sixth 
the degree of cooperation which is influenced by the bidding approaches vary from target bidding 
with a guarantee to a more flexible partner bidding approach that allows for more novel 
technologies. 
Overall, the variety of approaches and scale of EPC application enabled by the different PFEPCs is 
contributing to increasing the viability of EPCs in the public sector by building trust in alternative 
procurement processes and delivery business models. The innovativeness of specific PFEPCs often 
lies less in the diffusion of ‘developmental’ innovative energy efficient solutions although partner 
bidding approaches create favourable conditions for innovation (Edquist, 2012; Lords, 2011; Uyarra, 
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2014b). On the other hand, these approaches which increase standardisation and bundling prove 
successful at lowering transaction cost, which enables ESCOs to address projects which would not be 
considered in the absence of PFEPCs due to high transaction costs. This particular organisational 
innovation opens the market up to new approaches to implementing cost-effective energy efficiency 
measures. A danger of losing in-house energy management capacity is something clients need to be 
aware about when considering EPCs and outsourcing more generally but some of the PFEPC 
approaches actually play an important role in pooling skills and resources within public sector 
organisations. 
These aspects point towards PFEPCs as successful examples of PPI and towards the usefulness of PPI 
typologies for the classification and analysis of PFEPCs. We have expanded Edquist and Zabala-
Iturriagagoitia’s (2012) typology relating to the level of cooperation between ESCO and client and 
the degree to which a PFEPC aims at replicating the process. Even if the technologies installed may 
not necessarily be innovative, their application in locations where they were not applied before as 
well as the reduction of transaction costs to enable EPCs to address high energy demand in the first 
place can be considered innovative. Combined with competitive and/or partner bidding processes 
and cooperative development approaches, PFEPCs have the potential provide innovative approaches 
to energy management and retrofitting in some areas of the public sector. 
There are some potential issues arising out of developing EPCs on the basis of supply technologies in 
relation to energy demand reduction as projects based on CHP for example may lend themselves 
less to energy demand reduction. Reducing transaction costs through the implementation of 
incremental technology may also miss the opportunity to implement more innovative solutions 
although the development of trusted relationships through successful EPCs may encourage 
alternative approaches in the future. Whether PFEPCs provide appropriate incentives for the 
diffusion of developmental and radical innovations required to achieve energy efficiency and carbon 
savings targets is unclear but 10-20% average guaranteed energy and CO2 savings, in some cases up 
to 50%, are significant and may build confidence in the EPC model and energy efficiency investments 
more generally. What is yet unclear is how outsourcing to large ESCOs may contribute to lock-in 
associated with long-term contracts between ESCOs and clients and what a loss in control over in-
house energy management capacities implies in the long-term. It is also unclear in how far projects 
focusing on infrastructure replacement and addressing investment backlogs can contribute to saving 
energy and carbon beyond low-risk technological efficiency gains. 
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Definitions 
x Call off: An individual contract under a framework agreement whose length is determined by 
the purchases in question and value for money considerations4. 
x Contracting Authority: ‘means the State, regional or local authorities, bodies governed by 
public law, associations formed by one or several of such authorities or one or several of 
such bodies governed by public law’5. 
x EPC: Energy Performance Contracts focus upon the delivery of final energy services, such as 
mobility and illumination, rather than individual end-use technologies. 
x EPC provider: guarantees a specified level energy savings over a defined period, finances the 
capital investment from these savings and verifies those savings through agreed procedures 
for monitoring and verification. 
x ESCOs: Energy Service Companies offering contracts (commonly termed energy service 
contract, of which EPCs are a subset) for the provision of energy services. 
x Innovation: new technological or organisational processes and products. 
x Investment grade audit: IGAs involve the analysis of technical components of individual or 
multiple technologies, sometimes entire buildings or sites, to establish the economic 
feasibility of installing energy efficiency measures. 
x M&V: Measurement and Verification is the process of quantifying and monitoring energy 
savings resulting from the installation of energy efficiency measures 
x Mini-competition: To shorten the procurement procedure some frameworks pre-approve 
suppliers which may bid for a contract through a mini-competition. 
x O&M: Operation and Maintenance involves fixing equipment and ensuring that equipment 
performs according to specification. 
x OJEU procurement rules: European Union Procurement Directives 6 7  establish public 
procurement rules. These rules apply to any public purchase above the defined threshold 
throughout the EU and are designed to open procurement and ensure free movement. 
Contracts must be advertised (contract notices published) in the Official Journal of the 
European Union (OJEU)89 (see Annex). 
x Partner bid: The client and an ESCO enter into a partnership to develop the project before 
the targets are guaranteed. This approach is conducive to fostering innovation. 
x PFEPC: OJEU compliant procurement frameworks for EPCs that reduce the transaction costs 
of negotiating and establishing contracts and monitoring contract performance. 
                                                          
4 OGC, 2008, Framework Agreements – OGC Guidance on Framework Agreements in the Procurement 
Regulations, Office of Government Commerce, London. 
5 EU, 2004, Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Official Journal of the 
European Union, Brussels, Article 1.9. 
6 EU, 2004, Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Official Journal of the 
European Union, Brussels. 
7 EU, 2004, Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Official Journal of the 
European Union, Brussels. 
8 DCLG, 2014, ERDF National Procurement Guidance ERDF-GN-1-004, Department for Communities and Local 
Government, London. 
9  Design Buildings Wiki, 2015. OJEU procurement procedures, < 
http://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/OJEU_procurement_procedures >. 
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x Pre-qualification questionnaire: Assesses the commercial, technical and financial suitability 
of parties. PQQs help the contracting authority shortlist interested organisations according 
to minimum qualification criteria. 
x Procurement framework: a legal document setting out terms and conditions under which 
public organisations can purchase goods or services from pre-approved suppliers. 
x Public Procurement: the purchase of goods and services from third parties by a Contracting 
Authority. 
x Public procurement for innovation: purchasing the fulfilment of certain functions within a 
reasonable period of time. 
x Regular public procurement: purchasing standard products ‘off-the-shelf’ with only price and 
quality of the product taken into consideration. 
x Soft-touch measures: Energy efficiency measures which do not require construction work or 
the replacement of infrastructure such as lighting/light fittings, building energy management 
systems (BEMS), boiler replacement and voltage optimisation as opposed to the installation 
of district heating systems, chilled water systems or replacing windows. 
x Target bid: The client suggests targets in percentage of energy savings, capital costs savings 
and payback periods. This approach may limit innovation as it is perceived to be too 
descriptive by ESCOs. 
 
7.2 Box 2 Award criteria for tenders 
The procedure for the award of a contract depends on whether the tender is: 
x Open procedure which does not involve a pre-qualification process or short-listing process. 
Anyone responding to the OJEU notice is issues with the full contract documentation. 
x Restricted procedure involves a pre-qualification process. Only short-listed candidates are 
invited to tender. 
x Competitive dialogue procedure involves a pre-qualification process. Short-listed candidates 
are invited to take part in a dialogue process and upon completion, final tenders are invited. 
x Competitive negotiation procedure involves a pre-qualification process. Short-listed 
candidates are invited to take part in a negotiation process, which can continue even after 
the preferred bidder has been appointed. 
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7.3 List of interviews 
1 19.2. 2014 Verification expert 
2 26.2.2014 Verification expert 
3 6.3.2014 Fund manager 
4 7.3.2014 Market analyst 
5 14.3.2014 Finance expert 
6 28.5.2014 Trade Association 
7 5.6.2014 ESCO 
8 20.6.2014 PFEPC 
9 1.7.2014 ESCO 
10 17.7.2014 ESCO 
11 23.7.2014 PFEPC 
12 23.9.2014 PFEPC 
13 24.9.2014 Legal advisor 
14 23.10.2014 ESCO 
15 7.11.2014 PFEPC 
16 19.11.2014 ESCO 
17 20.11.2014 ESCO 
18 20.11.2014 PFEPC 
19 20.11.2014 ESCO 
20 20.11.2014 ESCO 
21 1.4.2015 Researcher 
22 12.6.2015 PFEPC 
23 12.6.2015 Legal advisor 
 
7.4 PFEPC tender information 
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  CEF Essentia Ecovate RE:FIT P-EPC 
Contracting authority Countess of Chester Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation 
Trust Essentia Trading on behalf of 
Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation 
Trust 
King's College Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Transport for London (Premises 
Projects and Commercial Services on 
behalf of the Greater London 
Authority 
Peterborough City Council 
Type of contracting 
authority 
Body governed by public law Body governed by public law Body governed by public law Regional or local authority Regional or local authority 
Main activity Health General public services and Health General public services and Health General public services General public services and 
Environment 
Contract on behalf of 
other contracting 
authorities 
NHS Bodies and various other public 
sector organisations 
UK public sector bodies UK public sector bodies UK public sector bodies Local authorities, educational 
establishments, registered social 
landlords, and equivalent contracting 
authorities in the UK 
Title National Framework Agreement to 
supply carbon and energy 
infrastructure upgrades 
Strategic Sustainability 
Transformation Framework 
National Framework for Energy, 
Carbon and Backlog Maintenance 
Management Services – Performance 
Contract 
RE:FIT framework (public buildings 
retrofit programme) 
Blue Sky Peterborough: Energy 
Performance Contracting Programme 
Type of contract  Service category No 12 Service category No 12 Service category No 12 Service category No 12 Service category No 14  
Number of operators 10 ESCOs chosen for mini-
competition 
8 ESCOs chosen for mini-competition Maximum number of 8 of the UK’s 
‘most accomplished’ ESCOs 
12 ESCOs chosen for mini-
competition 
1 ESCO chosen 
Contract length 15-30 years (after installation) or the 
life of the plant installed 
Not specified maximum of 20 years from date of 
award 
Not specified Not specified 
Duration of the 
framework agreement 
Duration in years: 4 Duration in months: 48 with no 
possible renewal 
Duration in months: 24 with one 
possible renewal 
Duration in months: 48 (from the 
award of the contract) 
Duration in months: 96      
Estimated total value 
of purchases for the 
entire duration of the 
framework agreement 
Range: between 1 000 000 and 1 000 
000 000 GBP excluding VAT 
Range: between 1 and 500 000 000 
GBP excluding VAT 
Range: between 1 000 000 and 500 
000 000 GBP excluding VAT 
Range: between 1,00 and 500 000 
000,00 GBP excluding VAT 
Range: between 1 000 000,00 and 
500 000 000,00 GBP excluding VAT 
Source of finance Client organisation, funding sourced 
by the CEF, funding brought to the 
contract by the bidder and off-
balance sheet transactions 
Client organisation, co-funding with 
the bidder or funding brought to the 
contract by the bidder 
Client organisation, grants, 
government incentives, capital 
borrowing and off-balance sheet 
transactions or a mix of the above 
Client organisation, grants, 
government incentives, capital 
borrowing, loans, concession 
agreements, finance/operating leases 
and off-balance sheet transactions or 
a mix of the above 
Preferably Public Works Loan Boards 
(PWLB) 
Award criteria The most economic tender The most economic tender 
(weighted) 
The most economic tender The most economic tender 
(weighted) 
The most economic tender 
Date of dispatch of 
contract notice 
1.5.2015 28.9.2013 4.10.2013 11.5.2012 25.5.2012 
Date of contract 
award decision 
  1.4.2014   9.1.2013 14.8.2013 
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7.5 Service categories according to Directive 2004/18/EC 
Service category No 12: Architectural services; Engineering services and integrated engineering 
services; Urban planning and landscape engineering services; Related scientific and technical 
consulting services; Technical testing and analysis services. 
Service category No 14: Building-cleaning services and property management services. 
 
7.6 List of PFEPC ESCOs 
Company CEF (Framework 3)10 RE:FIT Essentia 
Ameresco (previously ESP) * 
  Bilfinger *     
Bouygues * *   
Breathe Energy (MCW) * * * 
British Gas   * * 
Cofely * * * 
Cynergin * 
 
* 
Doosan Babcock *     
EDF * *   
ENER-G * 
 
* 
E.On * * * 
Honeywell11   *   
Imtech * * * 
Kier * 
 
  
Mitie * *   
Norland   *   
Schneider Electric12     
 Skanska   * * 
SSE *     
Veolia (previously Dalkia) *     
Vital Energi *     
Willmott Dixon   *   
 
  
                                                          
10 CEF has procured 3 individual frameworks under its name with a different range and number of ESCOs 
11 Honeywell is also the pre-approved supplier for P-EPC 
12 Schneider Electric was contracted through Ecovate to undertake an EPC at King’s College Hospital 
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